wwii questions

Hi,

I am teaching a class on WWII and I would love your examples/opinions on the following items:

1) Key battle(s) or operation(s) where poor/inadequate planning/strategy and inferior technology/weaponry was overcome by the ingenuity/bravery of the soldiers.

2) Key battle(s) or operation(s) where inferior technology/weaponry and/or lower troop numbers was overcome by the tactics/strategies of generals/admirals/commanders.

3) Key battle(s) or operation(s) where superior technology made the difference despite inadequate planning and/or lower troop numbers.

You can use examples involving any branch of the military from any party on either side of the conflict. I would appreciate any responses you have.

Thank you

1) A shining example is Stalingrad. Due to Stalin's 'not one step back' order, the average Red Army faced bullets from both directions, German bullets during an assault and Russian bullets if they 'deserted' (retreated in the facing of overwhelming firepower. In addition, most officers refused to deviate from operations orders, partly as a result of poorly educated and experienced officer corps (due to 1937-38 purges) and due to fearing the result of showing initiative.Ordinary soldiers showed outstanding ingenuity, bravery, endurance and leadership.

Wake Island: Though not a victory in the traditional sense, Wake was a study in overcoming adversity, inferior weaponryoverwhelming power and numbers on the part of the enemy. Wake had only a handful of obsolescent fighter, ancient 3- and 5-inch shore batteries (4 and 2 respectively, I believe), and perhaps two dozen marines. Situated 1832 mi (2951km) W of Oahu and 1184 mi (1908 km) SW of Midway, Wake truly held no strategic value. In fact, its primary use was a stopover point for the 'China Clipper', the flying bought that ferried largely civilian passengers across the Pacific.

Given the state of world affairs, the smartest (and most humane) thing to do would have been to evacuate Wake Island when it became obvious that Japan was going to war with us. In any event, this handful of Marines, by determination, ingenuity, sterling service and, above all, honor, held off a vastly superior Japanese force for more than two weeks. It is chilling to imagine what those gallant defenders got for their defiance - the Japanese were not known for their humanity.

One example could be the German offensive in the West in 1940 - especially Manstein's operation 'Sichelschnitt'.

Regards,

...

The Battle of Britain started with 640 British fighters to hold off 2,600 Axis aircraft. Compared to the Germany radar of the time, British radar was very primitive. However, Sir Hugh Dowding had created an integrated fighter control system, based on radar and observation posts to track the enemy, that almost certainly made the difference between success and failure. For details of the battle, I suggest the offical RAF site:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/bobhome.html

Colin Bignell

The sea battle off Samar, the climax of the battle of Leyte Gulf, October 1944. Here a hopelessly outgunned American task force turned back the main Japanese thrust against the American amphibious landings on Leyte Island, due in large part to ferocious and fearless resolve on the part of the lesser force.

These types of judgements are usually arguable, and it is hard to find examples where several of the factors don't overlap. To provoke a

little thought, try

: 1) Key battle(s) or operation(s) where poor/inadequate planning/strategy : and inferior technology/weaponry was overcome by the ingenuity/bravery of : the soldiers.

How about the 'Battle of the Bulge'? A thinly held sector because senior strategists did not think Germany had the strength for a major counter-offensive, nor the ability to pull it off at that location. Underequipped to battle the armored forces thrown at them, the American troops surprised the Germans (and even a few Americans) with their tenacious defense. Troops that were supposed to 'fold' instead gummed up the tracks of the advancing German forces, allowing for a good recovery. During many key early phases, US units fought at the company/battalion

level out of contact with one another amidst vast confusion. It is situations like that where the 'individual strength/ability' of the lower ranks can either shine or fall flat. Someone suggested Stalingrad, but I'm not so certain it would apply as poor strategy. Certainly it cost a lot of lives to hold Stalingrad, but the Soviets had a real counter-offensive on their minds, and when it came it was a terrible blow to the Germans (the Stalingrad pocket) and was almost much worse (cutting of the forces in the Caucaus). Stalingrad was a disaster for the Germans, not the Soviets. Of course, being my usual cynical self, I can't help but note that when other nations make valiant (if costly) defenses they are 'suicidal' or 'don't care about human life.' Americans defending unimportant posts, like Wake, are 'brave' and so on.... Ce la Vie.

: 2) Key battle(s) or operation(s) where inferior technology/weaponry and/or : lower troop numbers was overcome by the tactics/strategies of : generals/admirals/commanders.

Well, not really inferior technology, but the early British campaign against the Italians in Africa (prior to the Afrika Corps being introduced) ranks as one of the all-time great operations - even if it was largely

overshadowed by later events. The British, with a good deal of numerical inferiority (but better tanks, other equipment variable) wiped out the

Italians. Among other things, took over 90 thousand prisoners and had IIRC fewer than 1 thousand combat deaths. The Italians had neither the hardware for first class armored warfare, nor the generalship for maneuver combat, and the British realized this and capitalized on it marvelously. To a certain extent, the Germans on both fronts (West and East) could be considered to have used superior staff/strategy to hold if (if not defeat) their enemies. By 1943 in the East (and after D-Day in 1944 in the West), the Germans were facing numerically superior enemies who also often had superiority in numbers/quality of equipment. They had to be beat down and chewed up, not out-generaled.

: 3) Key battle(s) or operation(s) where superior technology made the : difference despite inadequate planning and/or lower troop numbers.

U.S. amphibious assaults during the 'island hopping' campaigns in the Pacific. US troops fought viciously, but it is hard to imagine how they would have fared without superior firepower/technology. From landing craft and air supremacy to offshore bombardment and the logistical capabilities that allowed prodigious use of weapons

Hi Stuart,

Find below my answer to your question. Part of it is based on other given answers. It should be noted that it is a macro vision. Obviously, battles sometimes have subtle details, similar to answer I give in number 3.

As already posted Stalingrad would, partially, be a good example. The first part of the battle between September-Early days December 1942 when soviet troops not so well organized and equipped tried to stop german superior troops advancing towards the city. Had the soviet troops surrendered, the situation in the east and even the whole europe could be much more critical than it already was. After, mid December, soviet troops began a clever counter offensive, as already said on this topic.

Search for books about Stalingrad and even Google/internet. If you want a recommendation try: Stalingrad, Antony Beevor.

Someone quoted Manstein's operation 'Sichelschnitt' and I agree. Luckly I was reading a book of mine which mention this operation. Originally this plan 'Sichelschnitt' was conceived for WWI, Germans were trying to reuse it to invade France in 1940. After some quarrel in german high command the plan was a modified, but some historians still named it 'Sichelschnitt' or modified 'Sichel...'. For us, it may be better know as Ardennes offensive (don't make confusion with 1944 offensive of same name which is also known as battle of bulge).

Today it is known that german troops were inferior in number to french and british troops. Some even say that germans tanks were not superior to allied tanks and anti-tank weaponry. Yet, good use of strategy, made the germans win french in north and then south, despite fierce resistance in some places.

Can't recommend any book. The I read is about Panzer tactics.

A) In the same Ardennes offensive in 2, there occurred an episode to the west of city of Lille (if I am not wrong) where Rommel tanks advanced too much and detached from accompanying infantry division. The later were then met by a british column of about 70 heavy tanks which then caused a good damaged to germans and a convulsion in the area. Anyway, this single episode made the German high command issue an order to stop offensive in the north of France, which, in turn, give allied some time to organize defense in area an later the Dunkirk retreat, which saved about 200.000 men from possible captivity.

Desperate use of ME-262 by luftwafe at end of war. They did not end the result of war but caused heavy losses to allied. It is said as something up to 700 planes in 9 months of operation. I would say the real figures could be 350 to 400 planes which is still a huge amount. If you count number of lifes, (the jet aimed mainly the bombers) numbers could be up to 2000 or more well trained and good men.

Try some german book about ME-262 operations as reference.

Rgds,

Actually, the British radar had very little to do with winning the Battle of Britain. It was actually a cover story to hide that fact that early in the war during the German invasion of Poland, British secret service had stolen a German Enigma encoder/decoding device so the time, number, course and altitude of the incoming German raiders were known since the German high command was totally confident in the 'unbreakable' encryption device that they radioed every battle plan to the various units.

The radar unit the British had back then was not the type that most of us thinks of today: a round screen with a rotating scanning beam and a blip on any radar contact. It was more like the screen on a osciloscope with a wavey line. You could not tell for example the exact altitude nor the numbers of the incoming German planes and more importantly, the actual targets of their raid. But because the British could read the orders and knew the exact course and number, although the RAF were outnumber, they were able to send just enough interceptors to meet the bombers.

Sir Hugh Dowding for years after he left the RAF was haunt by the fact that he had to send pilots to meet terrible odds because there simply was not enough planes to meet every onslaught and so he had to send just barely enough to scare the bombers into pre-maturely dropping their bombs before reach their targets. Plus, the city of Coventry had to be sacrificed to preserve the secrecy that the British had an Enigma because the Germans began to the suspect that something was amiss and deliberately selected a city with no military value to see if the British would also intercept the bombers. The British commanders (including Churchill) realized it and allow the bombers through.

Ironically, the German radars were far in advance to the Allies but the Germans thought they were behind in development. The Allies actually stole the German designs under the cover of a failed raid at Dieppe. The cover story was that the raid at Dieppe was to test amphibious assault on the coast of Europe as a prelude to the D-Day invasion. The commandoes' actual target was a German radar installation near Dieppe.

I don't know if the book is in print, but if you're interested try finding the book 'A Man Named Intrepid'.

Actually, the historical record supports that rather well.

The Japanese, in fact, were particularly lauded by the International Red Cross for their exemplary treatment of POWs in the Russo-Japanese War. In fact, some POWs resisted repatriation, preferring to live under the Japanese (remember, the choice was a return to Tsarist Russia.)

That's wonderful, and all, but that doesn't change the fact that the Japanese during the Meiji Era were known for being quite proper in their treatment of POWs.

Actually,if Ms Chang claims this, she has yet another black mark against her work. The Japanese actions in Nanking were bad enough that such distortion is not only unnecessary, but throws into doubt her other assertions.

Nonsense; retreat is always a part of military doctrine.

They do not seem to be correct, actually.

Where to start with this one.

1) Possession of an enigma machine did not equal cracking the codes, the Germans expected to lose some, they were used close to the front. The problem was cracking the daily settings, not a copy of the machine.

2) The Germans thought the idea no letter would encipher to itself a strength when it was a major weakness.

3) Pre war the Poles were the most advanced in cracking the daily settings, the Germans increased the complexity and the Poles effectively called in the French and British, who were not as advanced, to help.

4) The Germans did not radio every battle plan to their units, nor did the British intercept all, nor did they decode all that was intercepted.

5) The British used the enigma as the basis for their typex (Type X) code writer, same basic idea.

6) The idea the British could rely on always being told what the Luftwaffe was up to is absurd.

7) The final logic test, presumably all the people involved in the raid plotting system knew of how the RAF high command would tell them what to do, the raid information would come from above, not the radar network and all of those people have kept quiet for the rest of their lives.

Presumably the same thing applies in reverse, the Luftwaffe was reading allied codes to determine what raids were incoming? If radar is that poor?

The above assumes all the British radar in 1940 was the original type, which did not display via the 'classic' round screen, and which only looked outwards.

Radar has always had trouble telling the height of aircraft, the physics of the wavelength used (you can more accurately measure bearing by eye, smaller wavelength, for example), it was better a measuring range than the human eye.

Also no radar could tell exactly the number of aircraft but it is clear experienced operators were soon able to give good estimates of numbers, humans can be very observant.

Try and look at the Chain Home Low or Gun Laying radars, much smaller wavelengths which became the basis of the nightfighter defences for example. The Chain Home Low stations plotted the low flying aircraft and gave about an extra 10 minutes warning than the Chain Home stations.

This has absolutely nothing to do with radar and everything to do with numbers, mainly the failure of the pre war training programs, followed by mistakes during the early wartime period.

Oh the conspiracy theory of WWII returns.

1) There were no German suspicions their codes were cracked in 1940. 2) Coventry was a significant manufacturing area. 3) It was a full moonlight night, really easy to see the target. 4) The British jamming was set incorrectly that night. 5) The Coventry conspiracy theory, whenever there is an effective result up comes the idea the bad guys could only do it with help from the good guys, who are therefore the bad guys etc. The Luftwaffe was good enough to have at least on effective raid in 6 months of trying, besides ever heard of luck?

The German sets in 1940 were better than the versions the British had in service, but the German sets were really still in the experimental stage and were comparable to the British experimental sets. Then the British and Americans pulled ahead with lower wavelengths.

So why were there no German airborne radars for 1 to 2 years after the British had them?

Yes folks, take a bit of the truth and turn it into fiction.

1) The Dieppe raid was a test of amphibious assaults. 2) The raid might have had a sub plan to look at a radar station. 3) Assaulting the beaches away from the radar station does not make sense if the radar is the target. 4) The earlier Bruneval raid was a deliberate attempt to capture a German radar, a Wurzburg set. It told the British the wavelengths the set could be used at and the lack of any anti jamming systems.

I would suggest reading the reports on allied and German radar.

I presume it is in the fiction section given what it is claimed to be saying? A book that came out in 1976 is not going to be an accurate record of allied codebreaking.

See the book Allied Radar in WWII by H E Guerlac as a start, the books on Ultra by Bennett

Geoffrey Sinclair Remove the nb for email.