Would Manstein in command made a big difference?

Although, this scenario would have been highly unlikely (given Hitler's control-freak nature), would Manstein or Guderain in command of the German armed forces in 1941 have made a vast difference to the Russian theatre?

Regards,

No. It was the nature of the geography and Soviet resistance that was the main difference on the Eastern Front. Only a far larger Wehrmacht presence would have helped the Germans and with the growing Allied might in the West, well that was not possible.

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For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' 'Chuck him out, the brute!' But it's 'Saviour of 'is country' when the guns begin to shoot; ******************************************************* *************

Theoretically it could have. Only god knows what Manstein would have screwed up. But let's assume that he were able to concentrate the Wehrmacht on Russia, not gotten into the Africa adventure, used the paratroopers in Russia not over Crete, allocated the Kriegsmarine steel to tank production, concentrated tank production to knock out ungatz panzer iv's and managed to deliver them to the front, and managed to get Goehring sacked, then I think Barbarossa could easily have been won. But with the Nazi's mentality it's hard to predict what they would have wanted to do next. In the most positive light, they would have controled continental europe and left Britain isolated in European politics. But I wouldn't put it past them to load the whole Wehrmacht on barges to land on the shores of who knows where, only to have the whole shabang sunk in the middle of the ocean. It's hard to predict fruit cakes.

Since the key turning point was the setback at the gates of Moscow in December, it's hard to see how. German intelligence did not know about the Siberian reserves, which were so crucial to the reverse. A different German supreme commander would still not have alleviated the fact that the troops and their equipment were exhausted and at the end of a very long supply line. The German general staff felt that the push on Moscow was the only way to end the war before winter, since it was the one objective which the Red army had to stand and defend. And a different German commander would still have had to face the same T-34 tanks and the same Soviet commander: General Winter. Now the following year at Stalingrad a different Supremo could have made a big difference but that's another story.

Interesting question. Possibly, they would have gone for Moscow in the Summer and if that failed, would not have suffered such losses in the following winter or wasted their time going for Stalingrad next summer.

Basically without Hitler, they would have had a high command that was more in touch with what was actually going on at the front line, instead of moving pins on a map.

I hate these sort of questions as any answer has to be based on hindsight particularly of the Generals in question. After all history has happened and we are left to argue about the minor details.

But consider;

Guderian's major criticism of Barbarossa was it's lack of a central objective. He felt the main objective should be Leningrad and then Moscow. Mainstein commanded Panzer forces in the North and he made phenominal advances having to be held back so the infantry could catch up. If either man had been in control it seems reasonable (given what both wrote after the war) they would have focused German forces in the North towards Leningrad and then once it had fallen advanced from the North West on Moscow. I believe this is a shorter line of advance and gives a better chance to acheive the main objectives well before the onset on bad weather and possibly totally disrupt the Soviet chain of command and control. In point of fact both men where a) too young and b) viewed with too much suspicion by the General staff to be given this sort of responsbility at thi stage in their career.

A more interesting question would be how would either or both have affected the outcome of the war if they had been appointed to such a senior position after Stalingrad. How would they have conducted defensive operations from early 1943 on. But there you go again...

Ralph H