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While I was impressed by much of what he wrote, there were several problems.
Dupuy & Dupuy created a mathematical model of combat strengths, based on a lethality index, which was basically an estimate of how many men, spaced at 1-meter intervals on a featureless plain, you could kill in an hour with a given weapon. The model continued with assorted fudge factors that generally look vaguely reasonable, and then it was adjusted on a database of fifty division-sized engagements in Italy in 1943 and 1944.
They then defined a numerical formula for evaluating the magnitude of victory and defeat, based on comparative losses, objectives assigned, and capture and loss of territory.
By comparing the victory ratio with the combat power ratio, they generally concluded that the Germans were 20% more effective than the Allies, which is a figure that I'd consider noise. I have no faith in the formulae to properly evaluate combat power that closely, and it seems to me that there could be systemic biases at least that great.
Dupuy & Dupuy knew nothing of mathematical models, not even knowing that that is what they were constructing. This meant that they didn't know if they were committing fundamental errors, and indeed I've read that somebody found that the accuracy of the model improved slightly with a lowered effectiveness for artillery.
There are other problems with trying to translate their 'Combat Effectiveness Values' into military effectiveness. They counted troops, tanks, artillery, and whatever on the battlefield, and aircraft sorties. This means that it would not include logistical superiority, or greater mechanical reliability, or how fast aircraft could sortie and be directed to the right place, which I'd consider important parts of effectiveness.
Despite all the negatives, I still found it interesting and in some ways impressive. They discovered combat effects by noting some of the differences between actual and expected outcomes. These weren't all new discoveries (surprise, for example, has been known about for millenia), but the set-piece attack effect was interesting. (Briefly, an army inferior in quality will do better if launching a carefully planned attack.)
The work continues at the Hero Institute, which you should have no trouble finding on the web. They do publish books.
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