Browning .. A Bridge to Far

Didn't the the real-life General Browning predict BEFORE Arnhem, that the operation was going a Bridge Too Far ... but in the movie he says it AFTERWARDS. Have I got this right? And isnt the movie then unfair to Browning in that it makes him look like he's second guessing, rather than being prophetic. (Incidently, how does Browning's reputation stand these days? I understand he and his American counterparts hated each other.)

Yes. Monty got an enthusiastic 'OK' from Eisenhower, and then showed his plans to Browning. According to the book of 'A Bridge too far' by Cornelius Ryan, P. 93-4 Browning 'asked 'How long will it take for the armour to reach us?' Montgomery replied briskly 'Two days'. Still intent on the map, Browning said 'We can hold it for four' then he added, 'But sir, I think we might be going a bridge too far.'' This would have been about September 10th - at the earliest stages of planning.

Browning's wife apparently waged a long struggle against the film version - the book appears to have been perfectly fair and accurate, but the film made it appear as if Browning had completely missed the concept of the plan. I've never heard why the film makers thought it better to change the 'plot' in this way - was it a Hollywood film?

As regards reletions - 'hate' may be a strong word. Remember, the american Brereton, the airborne corps commander, chose Browning to command the operation, rather than any other officers. There was friction between them, which came from different approaches, and the pressure to find a role for the airborne. 17 airborne operations had been planned and cancelled as the allies rolled forward in August and September 1944. In most cases the planning had been rushed and sloppy; this didn't matter as none of these went forward. Browning was particularly concerned about dropping his men with insufficient knowledge of enemy strengths, positiions, and without maps of the area on one or two of the worst-planned drops, and protested to Brereton. Brereton believed the gains of disorganizing the enemy outweighed the risks of dropping blind. Browning protested in writing, Brereton lined up a replacement, but then the operation was scrubbed, and the differences in approach were smoothed over.

My brief reading of the subject indicates that, despite his misgivings, Browning exuded optimism, and some of his own staff's work was over-optimistic and sloppy. The detailed plans seemed to utterly fail to take into account any sort of reaction from the Germans at all, and it was Browning's staff that produced this. It prompted one intelligence officer to ask at a conference if the 'carpet' of airborne soldiers which was to be laid was 'to consist of live airborne soldiers or dead ones'. This did nothing to puncture the optimism. It is probably fair to say, that so desperate were the airborne leaders to prove their virtue, that had Brereton's staff planned the attack, it would have been similarly over-optimistic.

Cheers,

Martin Clements

Quoting Ryan, the Biographical Dictionary of WWII does indeed say that Browning made the statement at the final planning conference on 10 Sep 1944, saying to Montgomery: 'I think we might be going a bridge too far.' The sketch calls him at one point 'waspish' and at another 'grim'. But he was married to Daphne de Maurier, so he couldn't have been all bad

all the best

It's a toss-up whether Browning or Brereton (U.S.) fouled up the Operation Market, more. Of course Brereton picked Browning over the experienced Ridgway.

Bob Tiernan

The way the film was written it's clear that Browning was being made to appear inept all the way. By the time viewers heard Browning say that he thought the operation was going a bridge too far their minds were made up about the man.

[snip]

Brereton commanded an airborne *army* consisting of two corps commanded by Browning and Ridgway respectively, with Browning doubling as deputy army commander. Brereton's biggest mistake was in not having two drops on Sept 17. Would have been a long, long day for the pilots but there were worse jobs being done elsewhere.

Bob T.

The post battle report from German Army Group B said, the main mistake was *not* dropping all the airborne troops on the first day. Ridgway probably would have demanded a complete first day drop.

All well and good, but he could have demanded pie in the sky as well and I doubt he would have gotten it. Quite simply, the 9th Troop Carrier Command and their Commonwealth compatriots had insufficient aircraft and crews for a full, three-division airlift. So it can hardly be characterized as a 'mistake.'

Bob T.