I think we have to make some definitions. The magic words I think are target size, concentration, accuracy and bomb volume.
1) Precision bombing. The bombing of pinpoint targets like the Ruhr dams, the Tirpitz, Viaducts, Bridges, V-weapon sites, U-Boat bunkers. These attacks were mostly performed with special trained units and often with special bombs (like the Tallboy, Grand Slam, Mistel/Aphrodite). The RAF used radio navigation like Oboe or GH for the aiming. The target size was small, concentration was high, accuracy was high, bomb volume was low.
2) Carpet Bombing. This was standard procedure for the USAAF from 1942 - 45. It corresponds to your correct description above. The targets were not small pinpoint targets but still precise targets, only larger, like factories, shipyards and marshaling yards and even troop concentrations. In reality, actually an area was bombed (as is always the case if more than one bomb is dropped), but it was well delimited. The lead bombardier, often a very experienced one, gave the signal for the bomb drop and his whole group (ca 50 aircraft) dropped its bombs simultaneously. Then the next group followed with the same procedure. The USAAF called it *precision* bombing and I have used the term in the same way. In the case of the USAAF the area bombed of one group covered about 500 m2. Early in the war the accuracy of RAF Bomber Command was not worth mentioning but things improved radically from 1942 on and since 43 also the RAF was capable to hit medium sized targets with medium concentration and medium accuracy. Examples are the Peenemünde attack, French marshaling yards in spring 44 and German troop concentrations in Normandy. In these cases not many bombs were allowed to fall outside the target area which was of about the same size as US carpet bombing targets. The pathfinders marked the target precisely, often using low-level marking. This accuracy was needed in order to increase the damage to the target, to save the lives of the German occupied population or to avoid hitting own troops.
3) Area bombing. The purpose of area bombing is to uniformly devastate a larger area lacking specific targets. To my knowledge it was only used against cities. The initial aiming points were the city centers, often cathedrals. Then the Master Bomber instructed the pathfinders to drop their markers on places that had not been hit/burned sufficiently, resulting in the destruction of an area of typically 5 km2. The target size was large, volume was high, concentration low and accuracy was low.
It seems we have been talking about different things here. You call carpet bombing for area bombing, and I have called carpet bombing for precision bombing. I'll use the terms precision-, carpet- and area bombing as above from now on.
So, using these definitions, you are right, the heavies (or rather the crews) were normally not suited for precision bombing, despite the optimistic expectations of the USAAF early in the war. But I maintain that, given the right targets, they were very suitable for carpet bombing which is not the same as area bombing.
While these attacks indeed were devastating to the cities, they were not very effective against German production. The figures from the British post war survies I've cited earlier confirm this. In 1944 the RAF city bombing culminated but so did German war production. Why? Because there was not much industry in the city centers:
Actually I was borne, grew up, studied and worked in German cities. I think
Well, the thread started with the firebombing of Japanese *cities*, and my original point you were arguing was that this was never attempted by the USAAF in the ETO. But ok, let's talk methods. The RAF attacked smaller and smaller areas with higher and higher concentration, this was achieved by continuously developing pathfinder tactics, new bombsights, better target illumination and better radio navigation devices. Thus the RAF methodology developed from area bombing towards precision bombing, not the other way around. If the USAAF was looking envious at the RAF it was because the RAF sometimes had better accuracy than the USAAF. The USAAF strategic bomber force used carpet bombing throughout the war in the ETO. It never dropped its bombs individually like the RAF did. It seldom tried to devastate areas of the size of square kilometers. I cannot see any case in which the USAAF adopted RAF area bombing methodology in the ETO. There was simply no US focus on area bombing as you claim. The focus in the ETO was constantly on higher accuracy, even for the RAF.
Your point seems to be that if the USAAF had abandoned carpet bombing and used the less concentrated areabombing of industrial targets it would have been more successful. Is this correct?
Yes, USAAF carpet bombing had been disappointing. But only until spring 1944. Then it began targeting oil:
The USAAF did call it precision bombing. But although it was not precision bombing according to the definition above, it was much more precise than RAF area bombing. These US oil raids were very effective despite the medium precision. My sources say that usually 50% of the US bombs fell within the target area, which of course consisted of several 'blocks', whatever that is. (Alfred Price, Luftschlacht über Deutschland pg 103). In April 44 Germany produced 175 000 tons of aviation fuel, in Sept 44 the output had dropped to 7000 tons (the demand was 150 000 tons).
The chances to hit a viaduct with area bombing are actually very small because the bomb concentration is low. Not even carpet bombing was sufficient. It would also be a waste of resources to use, say 400 heavies (4 000 crews), in saturating 5 km2 only in order to destroy a single viaduct. That's why the RAF used the precision No 5 Group in the following raids against transportation targets:
6/7 Nov 44 Mittelland canal 21/22 Nov 44 Mittelland canal and Dortmund-Ems canal 1/2 Feb 45 Siegen railway station 7/8 Feb 45 Dortmund-Ems Canal 21/22 Feb 45 Mittelland Canal 3/4 Mar 45 Ladbergen aqueduct 14 March 45 Bielefeld viaduct 15 March 45 Arnsberg viaduct 19 March 45 Arnsberg viaduct 22 March 45 Bremen bridges 22 March 45, Nienburg bridge 16/17 Apr 45 Pilsen railway yards 17/18 Apr 45 Cham railway yards 18/19 Apr 45 Chomutov railway yards
I don't think so. Mosquitoes were used solely in the following oil- and transportation raids:
30 Nov 44 Meiderich oil plant 11 Dec 44 Duisburg coking and benzol plants 23/24 Dec 44 Limburg railway yards 28/29 Dec 44 Frankfurt railway yards 12/13 Jan 45 Synthetic fuel plants at Bochum and Recklinghausen 17/18 Jan 45 Ruthen oil-storage depot 18/19 Jan 45 Sterkrade oil refinery 26/27 Jan 45 Castrop-Rauxel synthetic-oil refinery 31/01 Feb 45 Dortmund benzol plant 1/2 Feb 45 Bruckhausen benzol plant
