Allies failures

On reading about the failure of Market - Garden, I keep shaking my head over the lack of urgency of some British commanders on the drive north to aid the paratroops fighting for their lives at Arnhem. Horrocks made clear that 30 Corps was 'the cavalry' to the rescue. So why the long stops by The Guards? First the slowww drive to Eindhoven put the plan in jeopardy in the opening hours. Another lonnnng stop waiting for someone else to repair the Zon bridge. Major Cook's 3504 famed assault boat attack on the 20th at Nijmegen led only to another lonnng stop by the Guards that finally doomed Frost's gallant crew at Arnhem Bridge. Harmel of the 10th SS asked 'Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? ..there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst?' Why indeed!

Oh. Dear. Here we go again.

I thought everyone knew that The Guards were hopelessy addicted to what the British Army puckishly referred to as 'tea' [1]. They were well known to halt at every opportunity to brew up a hit, even under enemy fire. In contrast everyone knows that their heroic, clean-cut, upstanding American allies never under any circumstances halted to eat, sleep, defecate or brew coffee.

As I recall they made it as far as Valkenswaard on the first day. I make it around 15km from the start line to Valkenswaard. Not too shabby for a single-day advance against determined resistance. You *are* aware there *was* resistance, aren't you?

That someone else being the XXX Corps engineers, who, not being combat troops, were sensibly following some distance behind and took time to negotiate the single crowded road leading north from the start line. Armoured divisions as a rule were not expected to perform major feats of engineering from their organic resources.

Never mind that the capture of the Zon bridge was entrusted to the US 101st Airborne who failed miserably to perform their appointed task, leaving it up to The Guards to rescue the situation. A theme that was regrettably repeated often over the next few days. Who was responsible for the defence of the supply line between Eindhoven and Grave? US 101st Airborne. Who actually had to fritter away precious strength desperately needed elsewhere? The Guards. Who was responsible for capturing Nijmegen and its vital bridges? US 82nd Airborne. Who actually did it? The Guards.

Long delay? Considering that the bulk of The Guards were *still* engaged in heavy combat in the heart of Nijmegen south of the river hours after the road bridge was captured (by Grenadiers tanks, not US Paras), getting the Irish Guards battle group collected, organised, armed, fed and despatched on their way to Arnhem the following morning was an astounding achievement. If it was so easy, why didn't the 3/504 swarm up the road instead? They were there north of the river after all, not mired in desperate combat with the SS south of it. Or didn't they consider their fellow Paras, albeit Brits, worth the trouble?

Here we have the obligatory appeal to authority, 'authority' being defined as any German officer who can be found to have made a gratuitous claim that happens to confirm whatever preconceived notion you may have, regardless of whether or not he has any basis for making said claim.

[1] Actually a disgusting beverage consisting of used tea leaves, powdered milk and sugar pressed into lumps subsequently dissolved in water forming a sickly, murky fluid topped by a layer of plastic-like congealed milk.

Someone, I forget who (maybe it was Cornelius Ryan in 'A Bridge Too Far', said that Market-Garden was an operation 'audaciously conceived and timidly executed.' There was a whole host of problems with the operation not the least of which was the unrealistic timetable that Monty and his planners set for XXX Corps' advance to Arnhem. It was dependent upon everything happening exactly as planned, and upon the Germans reacting just as the planners thought they would, and assumed that German resistance would be very weak. The Allies had just dashed across France and Belgium and were quite confident- some would say overconfident. Monty proposed his plan in early September 44 as a way to breach the Rhine and drive on into Germany. At the time he proposed the plan he had yet to secure Antwerp, whose port would be needed to supply such a drive.

After Eisenhower had given his approval to the operation, and during the preparations for the attack, his Intelligence chief, General Strong expressed some misgivings. He was concerned about the whereabouts of four German divisions, specifically the 9th and 10th SS Panzer of the IISS Panzer Corps with which the Allies had lost contact since the Mortain battle in mid-August. He concluded, based on Dutch Underground reports and his own analysis, that IISS Panzer Corps was in or near Arnhem, the prize of Monty's operation and the objective of the British 1st Airborne Division. Strong reported this to Eisenhower who then sent him to brief Monty.

'In Brussels, Montgomery also considered Strong's warnings carefully, but, committed by his own pronouncements, he had hardened on Market-Garden. Montgomery doubted that 9th and 10th SS were battle worthy and claimed he was more concerned about the Dutch terrain and 'adequate maintenance.''

German resistance may have had something to do with that, KG Walther may have only been an ad-hoc amalgamation of KGs including such dubiously reliable units as16th penal battalion, but it also included FJ and a regimental sized KG from IInd SS panzer corps. Examination of a decent map also reveals that the terrain between the border and Eindhoven is not very conducive to a rapid advance (unless you swing well to the left but that leaves the highway in German hands).

Waiting for the bridging column to come up and then building the bridge. The canal was a significant obstacle.

The Grenadier Guards group (2nd GG tank battalion and 3rd GG infantry battalion) stopped at nightfall and the following day fought all the way to Elst before being stopped by German resistance. Grabner gets slated for charging over Arnhem bridge, how about those stupid Brits making an armoured night attack against unreconnoitered positions with no artillery support on a single tank front? It is of course _possible_ that a night attack may have taken Else, but it was still only halfway to Arnhem, and the Germans had already recaptured the bridge there. I guess this is one move which we'll never really know the outcome for.

staying in Lent? ..there were

Just the infantry, anti-tank guns, light armour (if Jagdpz IVs count as 'light' and artillery which had been ferried across the Rhine over the previous days, plus the heavy company of 9th SS PzAA which was still holding the southern end of the bridge and moved to Elst once KG Knaust had captured it.

See 'It Never Snows in September' by Kerhsaw, gives a very detailed breakdown of the German forces available throughout the campaign. It was of course ironic that just as Nijmegen bridge was being captured, the Germans had bulldozed their way across Arnhem bridge - Frosts men were doomed when Nijmegen bridge was not siezed on the first day. The eventual capture of Nijmegen bridge was far too late to help them, and even if the Brits had taken Elst in a foolhardy night attack, there were plenty of places further up the road for 506th SchwPzAbt to park their King Tigers.

The only solution to the tactical problem of the elevated highway was the flanking manouvre across the polder subsequently executed on the 22nd, headlong tank attacks weren't going anywhere - as the Germans found to their cost in their attempts to counerattack back down the road. Harmel (always one for a pithy quote) said 'This fighting (on the Island) tore the heart out of 10th SS Panzer Division'. 10th SS was utterly wrecked by its attempt to hold the highway and was unable to participate in the Bulge, whereas the partially rebuilt 9th SS was, albeit as a weak second wave formation.

Cheers

Considering Horrocks pre op pep talk about 30 Corps being 'the cavalry', somehow the message didn't get through to some commanders of the Guards. Instead of going thirteen miles on the first day, the Irish Guards gained seven miles, and then were ordered to stop. Their casualties were nineteen dead, about thirty wounded!? Stop order came from Brigadier Gwatkin, explaining the tanks needed maintenance?! They sat for twelve hours. Why weren't the Grenadier Guards sent forward to continue the advance? Many junior officers were flabbergasted. By the next day the German defense was already stiffening.